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Normally, we tend to think of places as something quite well defined – they are what we live in or go to. But we do also regularly relate to more 
“fuzzy” kinds of places, such as those in the periphery 
of our daily routines, places that we vaguely know of 
but never enter, or those we might find ourselves in 
without understanding how we got there or how to 
navigate in. They may give us feelings of uneasiness, 
or they may require too large an effort to be deeper 
accessed. Further, we may deliberately avoid places for 
many different practical or psychological reasons. The 
disregard of places, momentarily or on longer terms, 
involves a cluster of judgements too complex to be 
comprehensively grasped in one singular theoretic dis-
cipline, like psychology or aesthetics. Theoretical deter-
mination of “place” and of qualities that we may label 
“placial,”1 involves by necessity a distinction between 
“place” and some other part of the geography that is un-
der current study. Recognised as either a background 
topology, as a counter-place, as a fake place, or simply 
being neglected, there is always a place-like entity left 
that has to be placed outside a current definition. What 
individuals, sciences, and urban practices distinguish 
as a place, and what they in consequence disregard as 
non-place, is indeed a facetted matter and depends in 
a complex way on our relation to the culture(s) at hand. 
Nevertheless, attempts have been made to explicitly 
state what constitutes a place – and when it comes to 
the design and theorisation of architecture they are an 
inescapable part of the game.
As a central concept in architecture, “place” has 
sometimes been defined through other disciplines 
and sometimes through individual opinion – cog-
nitively, emotionally, semantically, geographically, 
graphically, cartographically, politically, to mention 
but a few grounds for delimitation. They more or less 
involve each-other but highlight a certain aspect. And 
every time a place or the concept of “place” is defined, 
there are inevitably left-overs which do not fit into the 
current idea of what a place is. When a place is recog-
nised for instance by the amount of social activity that 
is going on, or when there is an aesthetic criterion like 
the harmony of landscape and building, that recogni-
tion inevitably also excludes phenomena at hand that 
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does not fit into the picture. This type of exclusion, i.e. 
this cognitive production of “non-place,” may be expli-
citly declared, for instance as an investigative delimi-
tation of what to regard as placial when performing 
an anthropological study. But it may also turn out as 
an unpredicted consequence of the fact that a certain 
type of focus is kept when a place is studied.
The aim of this article is to investigate this type of 
delimitation of place/non-place. Since such a produc-
tion is made virtually every time the word “place” is ut-
tered, or every time a place is designed, the scope of this 
investigation could easily expand out of hand. For this 
reason, and for the sake of addressing an influential 
type of place theory the subject is here restricted to a 
discussion about theories that deal explicitly with the 
concept of place, with a special focus on dichotomies 
derived from phenomenological thinking. The investi-
gation will also be done in respect to how a handling 
of “place” and “non-place” may unfold as artistic under-
takings. In the article it is argued – in a critique of theo-
ries of place that to a certain extent operate with dicho-
tomic preconditions of “good” and “bad” – that they 
essentially work against their own phenomenological 
spirit. This will be done in relation to texts representing 
the last three decades of architecture theory, authored 
by Edward Relph, Kenneth Frampton and Edward Cas-
ey.2 Contrary to making an unprejudiced (as far as that 
is possible) analysis of what architectural place is, they 
all seem to take for granted a certain type of “goodness” 
of a place. Consequently, an axiology of “good” and 
“bad” is initially constructed, which is also sometimes 
tied to explicit architectural examples. In the article it 
is suggested that dichotomic notions of place are bet-
ter serving reality when the are modalised, i.e. acted 
subjectively upon, or replaced by a graded succession 
of states that correspond to an experience of practical 
realities. Finally, as a contrast to the purely theoretical 
examination of places, an example of practical/ideo-
logical activity is regarded, an activity attempting at 
a modalisation of placial taken-for-givens, namely the 
techniques of the art (or anti-art) movement Situationist 
International. Their activities too, just like the works 
by the authors mentioned above, can be seen as a 
response to the unification and commodification of 
modern architectural environments, but with a more 
accepting, albeit not necessarily less troubling, type of 
sentiment towards the places addressed. In a reflection 
of the advantages and disadvantages of situationistic 
activity it is here suggested that for an artistic under-
taking or modalisation of a milieu to be fruitful, it will 
have to either stay utopian, or deal responsively, i.e. 
be in future dialogue with, that miljeau.
Non-place as a matter of theoretical interest:   
 a background 
In contemporary anthropology, sociology and geo-
graphy, as well as in the aesthetics of today’s art and 
architecture, the quotidian making of space (and pla-
ce) has showed to be a prominent theme, and phi-
losophers of social space like Henri Lefebvre, Michel 
Foucault, and Michel de Certeau, recur as referents. 
Through their works3 and others’, a paradigm of space 
as a background extension or “ether,” described either 
technically via mathematical coordinates or through 
formalist expression, is abandoned for an understan-
ding of space as socially and individually produced in 
the ordinary doings of humans and in the scientific dis-
ciplines. The focus on production, kept by these thin-
kers much in a critique of institutional (conceptual or 
societal) powers of spatial production, brought into 
light the placial properties produced and excluded by 
“proper” types of thinking or “taken-for-given” paths 
of practice. But they too had to create their own “non-
places” in order to put forth their ideas (or better, their 
counter-ideas). In fact, Lefebvre’s dialectical writing 
builds completely on the creation of opposites, and 
just to mention one, central, of the many dichotomic 
outsets of Lefebvre’s, one could point to the discussion 
of taking-over of space where he regards “dominated 
spaces” versus “appropriated spaces”.4 But contrary to 
many scientific models that claim (or have rigidly been 
accepted as) absolute validity, Lefebvre for the most 
part claim only temporary truthfulness, and the polari-
ties are thus continuously overruled by himself in a 
narratological succession of thought. Certeau seem 
to be somewhat more fixated, as concerns dichoto-
mies, in his critique of the static and taken-for-given or-
ders that he links to the concept of “place,” and the pro-
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ducts of individual freedom of action that he attributes 
“space.”5 These polarities are also linked, respectively, 
to his well-known distinction between strategies and 
tactics. And Foucault finally, runs, via the concept of 
“heterotopia,” a veritable modelling of a dichotomic 
place, namely the reflecting place that contrasts the 
utopias of society, and in that aspect society itself.6
In a more recent speculation about late modern 
spaces and places – or supermodern, to be more in 
line with the terminology of the author – Marc Auge 
has suggested a new type of interest for anthropology. 
Augé’s notion of “non-place” has in a certain respect tur-
ned this term into an established one, at least in recent 
discourse about the late-modern society, where archi-
tectures such as air-ports, supermarkets and themed 
places for recreation and tourism are recasting the 
identity of humankind as place-beings. Augé builds 
partly on ideas from Certeau concerning the individual’s 
navigation in places as a production of (new) space.7 
Certeau regards as non-places or “nowheres” those 
holes or “passages” in a stable (urban) fabric-of-place 
that can emerge as deviations in the acts of walking or 
reading signs. Augé follows Certeau in the sense that 
it is the individual’s perspective that is high-lighted, 
but his concept of “non-place” is fabricated more as 
a response to the anthropological fact that there are 
virtually no “true” places in an anthropological sense, 
graspable or uninfluenced by the one who recognises 
them, especially not in today’s society of fast, diverse 
and global mediation.
One of the most evident mechanisms of spatial 
exclusion at hand, which has only lately reached more 
prominent theoretical status, is the (lack of ) place for 
the woman in the world of the man. Feminist contribu-
tions to the space/place problem has highlighted not 
only the social patterns of action that virtually create 
non-places for women, but also shown the gender 
based semantic figures of thought of various discip-
lines, a taken-for-grantedness that not either the above 
mentioned “radical fathers” of late modern space phi-
losophy can free themselves from.8 From a philosophi-
cal perspective, one of the most fundamental contri-
butions is Luce Irigaray’s, who attacks a vast amount of 
male-conditioned thought-paraphernalia. She points 
to how the role of bodily difference between the sexes 
generates conceptions for the place and non-place of 
women.9 And she also discusses, very concretely, vari-
ous mechanisms for the domination of common space 
(such as noise as a right for men).
The politics of place/non-place, taken as a wide 
geographical issue, is central to the problems of national 
and ethnical formation. The attribution of phantasmatic 
images to countries powered as colonies or to places 
for recreation, not to mention the drastic fabrication 
of non-place based on “protection of the nation” and 
manifested as ethnical cleansing in war-time and “pea-
ce”-time, are two geo-political issues behind a con-
temporary geographical turn of interest in the social 
sciences as well as in the arts.
I will in what follows not so much discuss explicitly the 
concepts of these background authors, worthy as they 
would be of a critical study in itself,10 but rather devote 
this essay to a critique of a couple of texts that refer to 
a phenomenological tradition of thought, a tradition 
that also most of the authors hitherto mentioned have 
links to.
An issue of interest in architectural discourse, an issue 
with many facets, could be stated as a question: Has the 
new planning strategies and new designs been able 
to provide a sense of place at all, or has that particular 
ability vanished as the “old worlds” were successively 
or abruptly replaced? Are the places of today worthy 
of their epithet? In architectural, geographical, and 
anthropological theories about place, a recurrent op-
position is often stated: There is either “place” – genu-
ine, authentic, lived – or there is “placelessness,”11 cha-
racterised by anonymity, lack of life, ugly architecture, 
exploitation or other kinds of threats to a presumably hu-
mane environment. This type of separation recurs also 
in discussions closer to the architectural profession, or 
else in arguments about the guidance for the aesthe-
tics of a new prospect, as for instance in debates about 
the importance of “the context,” i.e. the (cultural, 
societal, environmental, climatological, topological, 
stylistic, etc) circumstances that surround the prospec-
ting of a new building, a new urban structure, a new 
highway, etc. The polarities relates to finance, style 
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and technological method and could be expressed as: 
context contra construction; regional contra high-tech; 
habit contra exploitation; local contra international. 
In practice, an architectural project involves a mix of 
these contradictory aspects, but “goodness” or “bad-
ness” of the placial qualities are nevertheless often 
taken-for-given as scientific or aesthetic facts, instead 
of evaluated as part of a forthcoming process.
Preferences concerning place qualities are theoreti-
cally coded into concepts like “spatial emptiness,” “non-
place” or “placelessness.” This type of axiological cate-
gorisation of actual geographies, for instance of places 
having none, or low, social or aesthetic value, or for less 
explicit reasons being not suited for place studies at 
all, sometimes influences the terminology itself, crea-
ting a biased semantic ground for place discussions. 
A concept like “site,” for instance, might thus as we shall 
see, turn out negatively loaded and even be treated as 
the primary representative of non-place-qualities. “Site” 
is then no longer denoting a potential placial concern, 
but is turned axiologically opposite to “place.”
The incentive in the following is not primarily to pin-
point the necessary distinctions between two different 
phenomena or two different labels, like for instance 
“place” and “site.” Rather, the aim is to discuss the axi-
ologies, the value systems, tied to such dialectics, and 
thus the values and preferences behind the place-dis-
tinctions. The assumption will be made that in connec-
tion to real circumstances there is an inevitable discre-
pancy between a concept like “placelessness” and the 
actual locus chosen to illustrate it. Suburban sprawl, 
forgotten backyards, supermarkets, airport terminals, 
or the vague areas close to highways, to mention just a 
few spots of placial concern, have occurred negatively 
as “non-places,” representing lack of for instance 
social complexity or architectural form. But as places 
for individual enjoyment or production, these types 
of geographies may of course be judged otherwise: 
where a politician or a city planner sees a social or aes-
thetic problem (“How shall we fill this gap?”), the occa-
sional walker may find an untouched area for meetings 
or recreation.
Providing a room for “place”
As a general phenomenon, “place” has in contem-
porary thinking often been regarded as something 
lived, created and reached for – contrary to a traditio-
nal view of it being a subordinate part in an abstracted 
or stratified spatial structure. This is a main thought 
in for instance Edward Casey’s The Fate of Place, a 
philosophical history of “the idea of place.” Casey de-
fends the concept of place in its own right, against a 
number of attempts to disregard it as only part of a 
system. “Space,” for instance, is regarded by Casey as 
a counter-concept, because it returns in the history of 
western philosophy as the abstract over-all extension 
that threatens to encapsulate “place” and surpass it to 
nothing but a small anonymous part of a hegemonic 
structure. And he considers the role of “site,” in philo-
sophy as well as in planning, as an even stronger threat 
to place-values. “Site” is thus turned into an axiological 
opposition to “place” by Casey, because it only situates: 
“site is the very undoing of place, its dismantling into 
punctiform positions.”12
Before going further into the dichotomies created by 
Casey, it should be stated that he explicitly discusses 
“nonplaces,” “nowheres,” and “absolute voids” on diffe-
rent levels. After having opened for the old philosophi-
cal (empirical) question of whether there is such a thing 
as a no-place – for instance as the state before we have 
anything at all – he concludes that the idea of an actual 
no-place is highly problematic.13 He states that there 
can be no such thing as an essential no-place, an ab-
solute void, because place is necessary for all other ex-
istence: “place is the first of all things.” That there are 
non-places in a logical or poetic sense is another mat-
ter, and Casey makes use of this metaphorical possibi-
lity in his own writings.
The understanding of space as an over-all structure 
is rendered by Casey as the primary and longest living 
threat to a multifaceted, subject- and body-oriented con-
cept of place. Philosophy’s early orientation of place-
like qualities as subordinated a panoptic or divine 
umbrella was slowly during the 15th – 19th centuries 
replaced by another umbrella with more scientific (esp. 
logical and geometrical) preponderance. According to 
Casey, “place” was never in the Western history of philo-
sophy given its proper conceptual status, despite the 
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fact that there were embryos for a more activity-based 
place-concept already in Greek philosophy.14 Descartes, 
Leibniz and Kant belong to those who, according to 
Casey, failed to give the concept of place a status of 
its own that could conquer the dominating idea of an 
abstract and geometric space that contains puncti-
form or merely relational places. While philosophical 
thought, in Casey’s view, for hundreds of years fabri-
cated the thought of place as mere location, it finally, 
in the 20th century via e.g. Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray, 
seems to start to incorporate subjective intentions 
and bodily desires as essential properties of place.15 
According to Casey, “place” has however still not been 
given its full rights and proper semantic demarcation, 
whether in philosophical conceptualisation or in the 
practice of urban planning.
A “site” is in Casey’s view a representative of the 
anonymous structures that threatens the values of a 
genuine and lived place: “Site is striated space,”16 and 
as such held by Casey as an abstraction and elimina-
tion of place-value. While “place” is, ideally, definite in 
its own right, “site” is, in Casey’s phenomenology, me-
rely a para-site to the real thing: “a place has the ability 
to really situate […] richly and diversely, [whereas …] 
a site is entirely extrinsic to what is sited.”17 “Site” and 
“space” are thus axiologically merged by Casey and 
mutually attributed a negative value in their du-
bious capacity of turning place anonymous. They 
are even viewed as instances of each other, in their 
ability to neutralise, or oppress, “place”: “Site is the 
realm of the anonymous position that place traditio-
nally has been given in space.”18
In Casey’s investigation of the place/space/site com-
plex, he is in search for concepts where “space” is crea-
ted out of “place,” showing that space-production is, 
or should be, something that emanates from a place. He 
finds this principle, more or less mature, in thinkers like 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Irigaray.19 He also finds 
it with practices that emphasise architecture as event, 
and in “transarchitecture,” where emphasis is neither 
on architecture’s expressive capacities, nor on its im-
passive (e.g. international style) ones.20 Casey thus has 
no trouble finding interconnections and mutual con-
tainments of space and place. But he seems to have a 
harder time with the incorporation of site into place 
and vice versa, which is strange because he in many 
ways considers “space” and “site” as two instances of es-
sentially the same attitude towards “place.” Since the 
concept of site is fundamental, if not taken for given, in 
architecture, as well as in the branches of contemporary 
art that deal directly with a geographical, urban or com-
munal circumstance, we may take a closer look at the 
place/site as a presumed conceptual opposition.
The development of cartographic representation in 
the seventeenth century is viewed by Casey in the light 
of this place/site complex: “To make place calculable is 
to transform it into site, […and…] metrically precise 
maps of the earth were construed as a global scene 
for sites of discovery and exploitation. How could it 
be otherwise, if place is conceived as a mere phase of 
space.”21 One must of course agree with Casey to the 
extent that the possibility to map an area has provided 
a neutrality that “covers” the suffering and unpredictable 
political consequences that follow invasions and exploita-
tion. It is, for instance, not very hard to imagine a group 
of strategists gathered calmly around a table using the 
map of another part of the world as ground for the 
calculation and imagination of a forthcoming vio-
lating scenario. In Casey’s view though, the violence of 
the cartographic “gaze” is solely site-oriented. His ex-
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planation of the implicit dangers of cartographism is 
thus tied to his main enterprise, namely an almost se-
mantic construction – or cleansing – of the concept 
of place. He thereby risks, in my view, to miss other 
possible forces behind exploitative and violating ac-
tions, and especially those forces that has to do with 
alliance with a place, i.e. more or less presumed bounds 
based on birth, family, ethnicity, collegiality an other “na-
tural” belongings, often used in propagandistic claims 
of “right” to a place. The type of desire that we may 
label placial fetishism, which can be evoked through 
maps as well via other types of indirect knowledge 
about a place, stories for instance, cannot be solely 
regarded as a site-phenomenon. The mechanisms be-
hind cultural domination and cultural exchange, need 
to be thought of as interrelations of place and site, of 
ego and alter, of nature and culture, and not as separa-
ted entities.22 Our psychological bounds to places may 
substitute for a clearer knowledge of them, a fact that 
shows only too evident in political and warfare activiti-
es, as in (fictitious) actions of territorial revenge. The 
complex mechanisms behind military or terrorist 
operations are often linked to the wish to regain, or 
to achieve a certain place, a place already existing in the 
mind of the appropriator. And so called holy places may 
in this respect host a double fiction – not only the re-
located divine existence but also the locus for perfect 
religious/political control. The will, thus, to possess, in-
volves “place” as well as “site.” We don’t necessarily turn 
a place into “a mere site” as soon as we situate ourselves 
external to it. On the contrary, deliberate unbelonging 
may even be the only possible sound relation, since it 
is critical, to the “roots” of one’s culture.23
What becomes obvious, in these regards of map-
ping, yearning and culturally conditioned being-out-
of-place, not to mention the daily investments in a “site” 
made by architects, artists and politicians, etc, is that 
sites are wishes rich of existential value. In arguments 
and petitions concerning sites we can hardly disregard 
the placial qualities involved.24 Instead of letting the 
analysis of the concepts of place and site suffer from a 
dichotomic categorisation we may try to examine the 
modalities of the vague semantic area where “genuine 
place” and “cartographic site” are supposed to play op-
posite roles. By regarding phenomena like habitation 
and exploitation as processes, and not as societal or 
ontological ready-mades, we will automatically be 
able to question the borderline that tries to hold “place” 
and “site” axiologically apart from one another.
The placeness of site and the situatedness of place.
On an obvious level, and in accordance with Casey, 
one may say that “site” connotes visual over-view, ex-
ternal law, territorial delimitation and speculation. In 
this sense it is not constituted by quotidian life, like a 
“place” would be. But the notion of site is therefore not, 
as Casey repeatedly has it, devoid of place-value. Rather, 
“site” depends on “place,” and vice versa.25 An atten-
tion towards a site, manifested for instance as a wish 
for something to be built there, can not be characteri-
sed solely as the axiological opposition to how a place 
is approached or lived, but better, as a pre-existent form 
of place. The semantic distinction between “site” and 
“place” probably has its clearest cause in relation to 
time – or better – change over time. By “place” and “site” 
we normally express two different stages (and states) in 
a process of habitational reordering. Seen from such a 
temporal perspective, the ideal “place” could be seen 
as a final stage, a fulfilled habitat, whereas a site would 
be the initial locus for a wish of some kind.26 Between 
the initial and final stage in a habitational process we 
will then have hybrid forms, partial places and sites, 
or stages of non-fulfilment. From a purely dichotomic 
perspective, these stages would have to be regarded 
as veritable non-places or non-sites, since they do not 
fit into the perfect polarity.
A recurring concept in the phenomenology of ha-
bitation is exploitation, not seldom used solely in its 
negative sense as depriving a population of its rights 
or destroying cultural, environmental or architectural 
properties. Exploitation can in that perspective appear 
as the inversion of habitation (high degree of exploita-
tion = low degree of habitation proper, and vice versa). 
In this line of thought, Casey associates exploitation 
with “site,” while treating it as the opposite to placial 
concerns. He also regards it as a definite state of order, 
as an agent of power external to the place itself. By a 
simple operation of thought we may disturb this “per-
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fect” dichotomy. By regarding exploitation as a pro-
cess, and in this respect point to the interconnection 
between sites and places, we will in the same moment 
be able to show the durational turn from the one to 
the other. If we regard this turn as a succession rather 
than as two contradictory states, we get the following 
approximate stages of exploitation:
 STAGE PROSPECTING  DOMINANT
 OF EXPLOITATION ACTIVITY  TYPE OF LOCUS
1.  not exploited none  place
2.   possible to exploit idea /concept  place
3.  announced to be exploited decision /concept/drawing   place (site)
4.   started to be exploited program /drawing/building   site
5.   newly exploited building  site (place)
6.  once exploited none  placen (site)
It deserves to be stated clearly here, that this brief gra-
ding is hypothetical: It could be made with other stages 
in mind as well, and the number of stages could be less 
or more. In the six stages here chosen, the starting point 
could be for instance an inhabited part of a town, which 
in the next step is chosen as site for a planning of a new 
area. The last step represents the renewal of place-
ness on the terms of the performed exploitation, and 
it is in reality the kind of step taken when a group of 
inhabitants are accustomed to the new milieu. Slowly, 
the new locus may become lived, i.e. inhabited by not 
only the prospected typology of inhabitants, but by 
those that start to inhabit the street (walkers, scaters, 
etc.) and its sometimes unforeseen market places (sel-
lers of fast food, etc) in less programmed ways. This last 
stage is therefore called placen (new), and could also 
be seen as the starting ground for a new exploitation 
cycle. The middle stages, 2 to 5, are here seen as more 
or less dominated by the enterprise of exploitation, 
even when the actual type of locus may be evaluated as 
“place.” In the succession here rendered then, the diffe-
rent stages of exploitation, principally characterised as 
influencing the domains of “place” or “site,” are thus not 
fixed. The occurrence of a parenthetical site or place 
in the locus column signifies that the change does not 
happen discretely but partially. The parentheses also 
indicate that the distribution depends on choice of 
perspective when judged. For instance, since “the 
dominant type of locus” reflects essentially a judge-
ment of placial qualities, an expropriator or a builder 
would probably see both a working place and envi-
sion a future place in some of the later stages where a 
person who was forced to move from the exploitation 
area only is able to see an anonymous site for building 
construction. The spectrum also depends on how, and 
by whom, the initial exploitative decision was made, 
and the effect of this decision in the successive pro-
cess. In regard of these flexibilities, this simple scheme 
of exploitation renders on principle the interdepen-
dence of site and place.
The (geographical/architectural/mental) stages of this 
process could be called modal, because they concern 
the way in which a change occurs (or how someone 
exploits/builds/experiences).27 These modalities con-
cern, as we have seen, first of all temporal28 adjust-
ments to a supposedly absolute understanding of 
exploitation. And they implicate that exploitation is 
not fixed, but consists of possibilities, probabilities and 
likeliness, or in other words, that exploitation is open 
for adjustment, a fact that can be used politically by 
both exploiters and exploited.
An act of exploitation is thus logically flexible, 
individually convertible, and politically changeable. To 
ascribe to “site” the negation of “place,” by linking it to 
exploitation, as in the manner of Casey’s semantic di-
vision, therefore blocks the dynamical interchange of 
sites and places, and eventually risks diminishing the 
possibilities to change and create places. The axiology 
of a “good” place versus a “bad” site runs in this sense 
against a dynamic notion of place, a notion where 
space is provided through placeness and situatedness 
in combination.29
We have seen so far that a preferential positio-
ning of “place” may turn out problematic, and even 
run against its own purpose of articulation of placial 
qualities in relation to spatial and situational ones. 
By scrutinising the phenomenological opposition 
between “place as lived” and “site as speculation,” 
via the modalities of an act that involves both parties, 
namely exploitation, the focus shifted to “place as crea-
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tion” and “site as potentiality.” In the following we will 
address other types of modalisation concerning pla-
ces and their supposed counterparts.
The sense of belonging.
Segmentation of place-qualities is not always a mat-
ter of the either-or kind of polarisation. The geographer 
and architecture theoretician Edward Relph proposed 
already in 1976 a modulated theory of place by linking 
it to degrees of identification. In Place and Placeless-
ness, Relph investigates placial experience in terms of 
identification with the place one is physically situated 
in. A central concern of Relph’s could be stated as a 
question: How is the complexity of identification taken 
care of in theories and schemata that claim to provide 
tools for the analysis and planning of places? What 
he does, as a statement against simplified notions 
of identification in urban milieus, and in an attempt to 
avoid the dichotomy of stating this identification as 
being either an insider or outsider, is to grade the mode 
of feeling included/excluded. He suggests an evaluation 
of place that to a greater extent take into account the 
complicated sense of belonging, by presenting a finite 
list of seven different types of outsideness/insideness 
– well aware of the dilemma of trying to situate an ac-
tual experience in this or that category. The categories 
may be listed briefly as going from high sense of be-
longing to no sense of belonging:
•  existential insideness (a selfevident, close habitual 
relation to a place)
• empathetic insideness (a reflected, respectful and 
understanding relation)
• behavioural insideness (a navigating, utilitarian and 
pragmatic presence)
•  vicarious insideness (a sense of knowing a place th-
rough mediation)
• incidental outsideness (a visitors attitude – place as 
occasional utility)
• objective outsideness (a deliberately distant and 
observing position of interest)
• existential outsideness (not feeling involved at all, 
even though being there)
As we see, Relph maintains “insideness” and “outside-
ness” as a dichotomic ground, which indicates that an 
either/or belonging is what essentially matters in eva-
luation of identification with a place. As we shall see, 
this is perhaps not a self-evident choice of ground. But 
before returning to this problem it must be admitted 
that this distribution seems to be able to describe for 
instance a process of integration into a community, 
where a significant turn might be felt when someone 
is going from an unbelonging towards becoming one 
in a group. This graded categorisation could therefore, 
as far as I can judge, in principal provide a terminology 
by which the conditions of social integration could be 
evaluated and analysed. Relph’s concerns though, are 
above all about a more general, and more abstract, 
feeling of identification with a place. And as we shall 
see, he is in the end more directed towards a certain 
type of architectural and urban “failure.” But first, his 
modalities of outsideness and insideness will be given 
some explanation and comments.
When discussing “existential outsideness,” Relph is 
not primarily interested in the type of actual social 
omission that we might call literal outsideness, which 
would be an exclusion executed either as a silent inter-
subjective non-allowance to a place, or as an explicit 
(governmental) statement.30 Instead of going deeper 
into the kind of social constructs31 that forms such phe-
nomena as homelessness, ethnical separation or spatial 
differentiation based on income or gender,32 Relph ren-
ders outsideness as an individual experiential pheno-
menon. He associates with “existential outsideness” 
primarily a type of personality trait – a constant feeling 
of being an outsider: “Existential outsideness involves 
a self-conscious and reflective uninvolvement, an alie-
nation from people and places, homelessness, a sense 
of the unreality of the world, and of not belonging.”33 
This type of experience, Relph says in acoordance with 
a common view of the artist-as-outsider, has “fascina-
ted poets and novelists,” and he uses Rilke and Proust 
to exemplify the type of mind that presumably have a 
greater access to the feeling that “all places are of the 
same meaningless identity.”34 When Relph discusses 
the concept of outsideness in its different modes, he 
is mainly concerned with the principal ways in which 
a visitor may identify with the surroundings. Both “ob-
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jective outsideness” and “incidental outsideness” are 
exemplified by the figure of a scientist, that for expe-
rimental reasons or for residential purposes relate to a 
place without having the intention of becoming a mem-
ber of the community.35 Relph views the scientist’s 
gaze as typically abstractionist and reductionist: “The 
attitude of the objective outsider effectively reduces 
places either to the single dimension of location or to 
a space of located objects and activities.”36 When discu-
ssing “vicarious insideness,” “the artist” returns again, 
now in the role as the mediator par preference,37 even 
though mass media and its “ready-made” renderings 
of places also are mentioned as having us imagine re-
mote places.38
“Incidental outsideness” reflects, in Relph’s model, a 
kind of attendance to a place where only certain func-
tions are selected. As incidental outsiders, we turn 
the place into a mere background for our more or less 
unreflective activities: “the fact that we do things fre-
quently overshadows where we do it.”39 In the sense 
that we don’t reflect very deeply on our surroundings, 
this type of outsideness therefore resembles the type of 
insideness that Relph calls “behavioural,” the cont-
rast only given by the fact that the latter involves a 
stable and habitual – though still superficial – atten-
dance towards the place. The emphasis of “behavioural 
insideness” lies with the manner in which things in our 
surroundings appear on a basis of “visual patterns.” It is 
thus based in the visual recognition that simply tells us 
that we are here rather than somewhere else, and Rel-
ph regards this category as “the narrow sense in which 
the phenomenon of insideness is probably most com-
monly understood.”40
Judging from Relph’s description of these seven ca-
tegories, it is not obvious why the inside/outside dis-
tinction should be kept as labels. A model describing 
the identification with a place could probably do well 
without a dichotomic ground for a modalisation. Since 
the model implies that a person is actually located in 
the place in question, but feeling more or less identi-
fied with it, it seems that the categories could very well 
be seen as seven modes of insideness. The 5th and 6th 
category could then for instance still be labelled inci-
dental and objective (insideness) and still denote the 
same types of experience, and the 7th could perhaps 
be labelled inhibited, or fictitious insideness. This way, 
the model would, apart from technically getting rid of 
one parametric level, be beneficial to analyses of pla-
ces where human presence is taken as an initial fact or 
natural precondition.
Despite the fact that “insideness” and “outsideness” 
are kept as a primary separation, and despite the 
grounding of the gradation of insideness/outsideness in 
a dubious scientific fashion where human experience 
is rendered as observable experiential strata, sorted 
by over-belief in the applicability of complex pheno-
mena like empathy, authenticity and identity, this 
model seem to have advantages in the discussion about 
the relation between the place and the individual. 
Relph’s categorisation is an attempt at modalising an 
otherwise polarised terminology of belonging, and it is 
consequently an attempt that could question notions 
of architecture as providing either place or placeless-
ness. If such a set of categories were treated with the 
caution of keeping the limits between them open and 
discursive, this would also be a clearer theoretical stan-
ce against the reduced notions of identification with 
a place, that are too focused on visual recognition, or 
too obviously made to fit into simplified demographic 
views of human activities.
From the overall perspective of exposing and mo-
dalising place dichotomies, Relph’s original seven ca-
tegories seem to come to a certain right as listed in 
the first part of Place and Placelessness. As such, they 
are promisingly interdisciplinary since they concern 
a combination of physical and mental modes of pre-
sence, and also because they apply to a sociological 
understanding of place as related to the influence of 
architecture. As long as this kind of diversification av-
oids supporting pre-established notions of “good” or 
“bad” places, it may provide a terminology for not only 
different modes of an individual’s identification with a 
place, but also for how an integration into a commu-
nity proceeds. Unfortunately, Relph himself does not 
in Place and… deepen or manifest this incitement to 
a modal theory of belonging, though. Instead, when 
dealing more directly with placelessness,41 his intent 
seem to alter completely, from a description of those 
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who occupy places, to a mere classification, or rather 
disqualification, of certain types of architecture.
Which places are lesser places?
Instead of fulfilling a modal aesthetics of place, Relph 
turns in Place and… into a discussion much more gui-
ded by preferential aesthetics of existing places. He 
defines placelessness as tied to failures linked to mo-
dern urban projects, and categorises architectural types 
as being placeless or not.42 By displaying photographic 
images of for instance houses or cities – suitably pho-
tographed from a distance, thereby given an aura of 
exploitation or anonymity – and letting them represent 
placelessness by labelling the places inauthentic, tou-
ristic, disneyfied, decorated, machine-like and kitsch, 
he turns the whole project dichotomic again. And this 
dichotomy is essentially based on traditional aesthetic 
clichés. It is not hard to grasp – nor at times to sympa-
thise with – his overall intention: a critique of sense-
less architecture that occurred with the unreflecting 
sprawl of uniform styles and technological package 
solutions, as well as of theoretical models that fail 
to capture this loss of “continuity with place.”43 But 
harder to accept is his taken-for-granted choice of ur-
ban fabric, a choice that manifests a traditional delimi-
tation of good and bad taste: old curved roads versus 
new motorways; old authentic villages (even ruins) 
versus new suburban “machines” to live in; etc. There 
is not much room in Place and… for easy-to-achieve 
bungalows or unplanned streets, corners, backyards 
and parking lots as vital urban possibilities. There is no 
opening up for the possibility of the modernity-born 
places as something to like as a home, to establish ac-
tivities in, to hide in, or to have meetings in. Relph does 
briefly admit, in response to a reading of Lefebvre, that 
“the ugly everyday landscape in some respect is a vital 
mess, because it is a more or less unselfconscious ex-
pression of peoples activities and wants.” But then he 
quickly re-package this promising “vital mess” and vic-
timises it in a simplified, if not caricaturist, view of the 
reign of capitalism: “[…] but it is however promoted 
and exploited by salesmen.”44
When placelessness is discussed as a contradic-
tion to ideal forms of well-being, and ideal forms of 
architecture, there is an obvious risk of accepting the 
already existing architectural tradition as perfectly suf-
ficient. Activities aiming at connecting people from dif-
ferent places are consequently seen as suspect. When 
for instance “other-directed architecture” is treated by 
Relph in a passage about mass-culture and tourism, it is 
in a negative way. It is described as “deliberately direc-
ted towards outsiders, spectators, passers-by, and 
above all consumers. Other-directed places suggests 
almost nothing of the people living and working in 
them.”45 Relph aims here at a critique of the “downtown 
shopping and entertainment districts where other-di-
rectedness reach their purest expression in the citysca-
pe of pornography and ‘pornscape,’”46 but his simpli-
fied and negative notion of “other-directedness” leads 
inevitably to a range of questions that must be asked 
but that fall outside of Relph’s self-assumed scope.
In relation to our understanding of placelessness, 
outsideness, and non-places we may then retrospec-
tively put a set of such questions here, necessary for 
a more adequate understanding of the production of 
placial dichotomies: What is an “other” in other-direc-
tedness? Who works at service-oriented places, and 
for what reasons? Who uses/lives in them? When does 
a place – or differently put: at what moment does ar-
chitecture – turn “touristic” and “other-directed”? And 
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ultimately, who would actually be served in a place 
equipped with “proper” placeness?
Place as a highly evaluated phenomenon.
With regard to the dichotomies found in Relph’s Place… 
and in Casey’s The Fate, as well as in other place-orien-
ted architecture theory where phenomenology plays a 
referential part, such as in Kenneth Frampton’sTowards 
a Critical Regionalism,47 we may have reason to pin-
point a problem. For the lack of a better expression, 
it could be labelled “the phenomenological ready-
made.”48 With this term I mean the presupposed locus of 
genuineness and ontological richness that seem to ap-
pear a priori, or else as an expected finding, in theories 
as well as in certain practices of architecture.49 A com-
mon denominator here is a “heideggerian anxiety” 
concerning the observation of a general (modern) 
loss of awareness towards the conditions of being.50 
Even if phenomenological philosophy in its original 
version regarded placial existence and the experience 
of “non-place” as inevitably linked, second hand inter-
pretations tend to keep these conceptual domains com-
pletely apart or even tied to separate empiri. 51 The com-
mon “fear” sensed in this particular field of thought, is 
that we as modern52 beings are loosing not only onto-
logical depth and a reflective relation to our life and 
our surroundings, but more specifically, that we have 
started to make “bad places.”53
A lorry driver on a highway, or a waiter at a tourist res-
taurant, does not necessarily prefer to move, or change 
habits, just because their daily places may be disqua-
lified, or labelled “inauthentic” in a discourse about 
architectural place. To detect “placelessness” a closer 
relationship is needed. The choice of an individual, or 
a community, not to mention an architect who ties her 
doings to that community, is hardly grasped through 
presupposed notions of good life and good places. 
A placial choice is more likely grounded in engage-
ments, or in the personal or ideological investments 
made to provide habitat, room for activities, space for 
expressions of opinion, etc, for oneself or for others. 
And these engagements concern both existing places, 
and possible places, i.e. sites. Also from artistic place-
related works, or site-specific ones, a field into which 
I will now turn, we may have reason to expect an en-
gagement beyond the implementation of a visual or 
conceptual ready-made.
Drifting as a modality of place.
Since uniformity and rigidity could be said to be the ge-
neral background against which any critical artistic and 
architectonic initiative is taken,54 it would be beyond 
the scope of this essay to try to give a view of this diver-
se practical undertaking of places. As a last entry to this 
discussion of possible modalities of place formation, I 
will therefore restrict the analysis to a specific practice, 
or practical aesthetic movement, that combines idio-
syncratic undertaking and social awareness with local 
investigation, namely the Situationiste International 
(SI). This movement has an initial resemblance with the 
theoretical investigations of place that we have so far 
discussed, in the ambition to address general (or basic) 
societal issues linked to a current state of architecture 
and urbanism. Just like many theoretical attempts at 
grasping place phenomena, SI explicitly set out to pin-
point, comment, criticise, and hopefully change, the 
rules of modern social grammar,55 rules that format, 
and are formatted by, the urban conditions.
Viewed in the perspective of the concerns of modern 
art and its links to other areas in society, the performed 
practices of SI may be regarded as an “early” example 
of an explicit attempt to combine the “aesthetic” and 
the “social” as modal factors of place formation.56 “Psy-
chogeography,” as discipline and as attitude, was laun-
ched as the study of geographical settings based on 
the “mood of the individual,” and condenses in way 
in one view their agenda.57 The situationist activities 
were typically performed by the members of a small 
group of people, but were also launched through 15 
years of more or less regular publication, as part of a 
general ambition to explore the city and its influence 
on the mood of its inhabitants. The sources of SI can be 
traced back to other avantgardist movements such as 
surrealism, but also to the development of public me-
dia like the television, and to the philosophy of Henri 
Lefebvre.58 SI took as one of its original inspirations a 
pamphlet written in 1953 called Formulary for a New 
Urbanism, a veritable blue-print for a future urban pro-
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gram, where such objectives as architectural mobility, 
individual choice, and substantial spatial emptiness 
were held high, against the artificiality and dullness of 
modern life forms, represented in the architecture of 
“storyless plasticity,” “air conditioning obscuring seaso-
nal changes,” “gardens where games are forbidden,” or 
“tourist places for free love.”59
When it comes to architectural propositions, SI’s 
contributions were for a couple of years more or less 
those of one of its leading figures, Constant.60 As Con-
stant grew more and more an architect producing 
highly elaborated models, and less a contributor to 
the anarchistic pamphlets conducted by Guy Debord, 
a split between them was inevitable. Since very few of 
his projects were realised, and if they had been they 
would certainly have lost much of their radical qualities 
as mobile, flexible and revolutionary, Constant’s (and 
SI’s) contribution to the tradition of architectural praxis 
must be regarded as indirect but nonetheless influen-
tial.61 If we want to come closer to the problem of prac-
tical modalisation of dichotomies, we would be better 
served if we leave this utopian architectural project, and 
approach a more “humble” and actually realised, but 
probably not less romantic, type of SI activity. In the 
case of SI the dichotomy of place/non-place is linked 
to the problematics of what was at that time felt as the 
emerging of the so-called “society of the spectacle.”62
One of the situationist practices – and as such one 
of the small scale techniques in their dealing with the 
large scale urban uniformity of the broadly launched 
life-styles that they pointed out as monotonous and ta-
ken-for-given means for living that were produced by 
the capital as well as of the power of state – was “drifting” 
(derivé), a systematic group-based type of strolling th-
rough chosen city areas, more or less peripheral. Based 
on collectively agreed preferences, whims or desires, 
it was launched as an investigative method that aims 
for states of disorientation combined with alert atten-
tion to the different urban settings that were “visited.” 
In drifting, efforts were to be taken to follow impulses 
that lead out from the expected movement patterns, 
at the same time as “paying attention to the terrain and 
the encounters found there.”63 Drifting was thus based 
on spontaneously created, but still collectively agreed 
“rules” for orientation, in analogy with some of the ac-
tivities associated with surrealism’s automatism, such 
as walking according to maps of another city.64 A drift 
could, for instance, be directed by walkie-talkie ins-
tructions65 from a part of the city other than that where 
the drift was physically performed. The objective was 
to learn to know urban life in a new and original way, 
more radically than could be done following the ex-
pected social grammar.
The SI documentation show little evidence of the 
actual effects that drifting had on the people or the 
communities of the city parts that were visited by drif-
ters, and one may wonder to what degree, if any, that 
people other than the drifters themselves were invol-
ved. The rulemaking must in other words be regarded 
as “exemplary” rather than operative, as concerns socie-
ty at large. The experiences were kept inside the group 
only to be secondarily mediated. In that sense the ori-
ginal SI drifters were visitors rather than partakers and 
influents. If we, only for the sake of comparison, return 
to Relph and the modalities of outsideness/insideness, 
a “drifter” could best be described as an outsider, both 
“incidental,” “objective” and probably also, albeit 
the difficulties of the term, “existential.” In a “drifter” 
these categories would conjoin into a kind of cong-
lomerate placial figure. As concerns the modes of insi-
deness, the original drifts made by SI would have to be 
seen in a larger context and or in a rhetorical perspecti-
ve (i.e. society as a “global” place – or Paris, perhaps).66
One may view drifting and other SI techniques as too 
historically bounded, or more precisely, too interested 
in the logic of the modern urban life as it appeared 
in the 1950s, to be transferable as a principle relevant 
for urban investigation or artistic attitude today. Guy 
Debord and some of his companions were romanti-
cally focused on an essentially impossible mission, 
namely to conquer the “society of the spectacle,” the 
all-encompassing mediation of a conformist modern 
lifestyle that threatens love, game and free individual 
choice. On the other hand, non-conformist urban tac-
tics is still a concern for any critical place-maker, and 
moreover, the conception of a society where human 
experience is “artificially” mediated seems to be 
ever returning.67
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What has to be recognised also, as a still working prin-
ciple of SI’s, is that they had a paradoxical, and creative, 
acceptance of the conditions at hand. They viewed the 
existing society and the prevalent architecture as mate-
rial to use critically/practically, not as objects to simply 
reject or replace. The main difference between the uni-
tary program of Situationist International, and the type 
obsolete aesthetics or idiosyncratic masterpieces, and 
calls for pre-conceived design principles, SI tried to es-
tablishes new and alternative types of activities direct-
ly in, or on, the urban landscapes that emerged from 
uniform (capitalist or state-governed) programs. And 
contrary to the ontological division between sites and 
places as advocated by Casey, the situationist attitude ac-
cepts the urban site as a self-evident part of a placial 
investigation. This does not mean that SI “succeded” in 
actualising a new urban paradigm. Their over-estima-
ted trust in a “common revolutionary consciousness” 
and the leadership’s obstructions against an actually 
constructed architecture (or society) based of the ac-
tivities of the members, meant that SI would become 
most accurately remembered, and actually most effec-
tive, if seen as a provisional ideology.
Conclusions
When “placial”69 qualities are discussed, we are often 
faced with value-based dichotomies such as “place-
ness/placelessness,” “lived place/anonymous site,” or 
simply “good/bad.” Beliefs in ontological difference, 
such as these, are necessary for a broad understanding 
of places, but they appear also, unfortunately, as fixed 
empiricisms or as a priori elements in simplified or 
ready-made phenomenologies of place. When axi-
ological polarities like these are tied to actual architec-
ture, or taken for given as an unquestioned ontological 
basis in theorisation, certain problems arise. As related 
to the built environment, such polarised axiologies may 
turn out as neglecting on the one hand the creative 
potentiality that lies in existing architectural diversity, 
and on the other, the possibility to influence the chains 
of events that lead to new places. And examples of archi-
tecture concidered as negative in such axiologies of pla-
ce, might conveniently be dismissed as solely blocking 
the “original” place-values that are supposedly true 
and grand. Despite an at times radical or critical out-
set, such as in Relph’s, Frampton’s and Casey’s critique 
of uniform architecture, the introduction of axiological 
oppositions between “place” and a supposed “coun-
ter-place” runs the risk of going against the original 
critical purpose. They may unfortunately turn out as 
enterprises of empirical exclusion instead, reducing, 
of theoretic reaction against architectural uniformity 
that Relph discussed as “place” against “placeless-
ness,” becomes apparent in the attitudes towards the 
“international” or “anonymous” architectural structu-
res. 68 What differs is their respective ability to accept 
the prevailing architectural structures and societal 
patterns as working-ground. While the latter, as do 
many others, returns to the “good examples” of either 
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and therefore failing to address other decision-making 
factors in place-formation, cultural factors of a more 
economical, political or societal kind. In the end these 
concepts of place may therefore become unclear or fail 
to function as an aesthetic positioning, if we regard 
aesthetics widely as a domain which includes judge-
ments involving the impact of gender, state politics, 
economy, race, etc, on what is traditionally called style 
or form.
As a way to question Casey’s axiological and ontolo-
gical distinction between “place” and “site,” I proposed 
a hypothetical modalisation of exploitation as a pro-
cess that showed the interdependence between a site 
and a place. And in another passage, while rejecting 
Relph’s distinctions between place and placelessness, 
I proposed instead a re-evaluation of his seemingly 
useful modalisation of belonging, or identifying with 
a place, as states or stages of insideness.
In artistic and activist evaluations of a “non-place,” 
the “negativity” may be seen as a resource in itself. The 
site where the artistic activity takes place, may thus 
be approached without the intention of turning it 
into an established “good” place. Such an intervention 
may be done with more or less intent of investigating, 
commenting on, criticising, or influencing, the current 
placial conditions. The specific, situationist, underta-
king of place as a locus for derivé, i.e. drifting as an ad 
hoc attention to a place while moving against normal 
cohesion, would typically regard a “dubious” urban 
condition as a material given to act in, to comment on, 
to reorder, and to learn from. Such an activity will thus 
modalise a place in the sense that it changes its evi-
dent role in the apprehension of the city. We may label 
it modalisation by personal intervention. The ques-
tion remains though, to what degree, and to which 
qualities, such an undertaking really effects the daily 
doings of the community in the area addressed.
llustrations:
Photographs showing the author at an exploatation-
site in Malmö, at a high-way restaurant in South of 
Sweden, and at office reading a map.
Notes
1. The attribution “placial” is the place – oriented analogy 
to “spatial”. This adjectival construction is not generally 
to be found in dictionaries, but it is used in recent phi-
losophy of place, such as Edward Casey’s. I will use it th-
rough-out this article in the sense: relating to, being 
the attribute of, or having the character of place.
2. Relph and Casey will be more deeply addressed here 
than Frampton, who will be mentioned mostly via foot-
notes. A more thorough analysis of Frampton’s “critical 
regionalism” will be done in a forthcoming dissertation 
on place and non-place, a dissertation of which this es-
say is a revised excerpt.
3. – seminal ones like for instance: the complex and ex-
tensive de-(and re-)marxist philosophy of space: The 
Production of Space (Lefebvre); the short, dense, and 
lecture-based sociological provocation Of Other Spaces 
(Foucault) and the proposal to a science of individual ini-
tatives: The Practice of Everyday Life (de Certeau).
4. See Lefebvre, The Production of Space, e.g. pp. 164–168. 
Having established the dichotomy of domination and 
appropriation – in short, the way space is abruptly taken 
over contra the way it is assimilated by recognition of its 
qualities – Lefbvre makes an effort first to distinguish 
them both from detournement, (or “diversion,” meaning 
a (temporary) re-use of an existing property with the in-
tention of radically changing its original task or status) (p 
167, 168.) In this context “disappropriation” is mentioned 
as “the abdication of responsibility” that occurs in a so-
ciety dominated by fragmented visual representations, 
of for instance bodies. In a later passage he makes an 
attempt to find, significantly, a dialectical synthesis bet-
ween (or escape from) these two opposites, in the notion 
of co-optation (p. 368 ff).
5. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life pp. 117–
118.
6. Foucault, Of Other Spaces. The launching of the concept 
of heterotopia as a specific figure of spatial and architec-
tural thought, was done in this short text, roughly outli-
ned, dense, influential, problematic.
7. He also reconsiders, as does de Certeau himself, Mer-
leau-Ponty’s distinction between geometrical space 
and anthropological space – the important distinction 
that also has formed a contemporary disciplinary inte-
rest of which Augé is a self-evident advocate and critic.
8. See for instance Mary Mcleod, ‘Everyday and “Other” Spa-
ces’, pp 182–202, in Space Gender Architecture, ed. Jane 
Rendell, Barbara Penner and Ian Borden, Routledge, Lon-
don and New York, 2000.
9. She does so, by effectively addressing major philo-
sophical “fathers of the fathers” [my quotation], such as 
Aristotle and Hegel. See for instance “Place, Interval: A 
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reading of Aristotle, Physics IV.”
10. I will deal more closely with Certeau’s place/space divi-
sion, Foucault’s heterotopia, and Augé’s non-place in the 
previously mentioned forthcoming dissertation about 
concepts of place/non-place.
11. This term is taken from the geographer and architec-
ture theoretician Edward Relph, and serves potentially 
here as a good general label representing this type of 
opposition. We will return to Relph for a more specific 
analysis of “placelessness.”
12. The Fate of Place, p. 186.
13. Ibid., p. 46. In this discussion he pays tribute both to Greek 
philosophy (especially that of Archytas of Tarentum), and 
to contemporary philosophical thinkers (such as for in-
stance Jacques Derrida, Luce Irigaray, and Jean-Luc Nan-
cy).
14. Casey launches Archytas of Tarentum throughout The 
fate of Place as a pioneer that foregrounds a body-based 
and action-based concept of place. Referring to Archy-
tas, place could be said to be that which is created when 
we stretch out for it. This concept has the implication that 
for any limited spatial extention, constructed to define a 
space or a place, there is always the principal possibility, 
when one is situated close to the border of that construc-
tion, to reach out and pass the limit. Ibid., p.101.
15. The idea of place as an extension of the body (Merleau-
Ponty), and the mutual enveloping between sexes as an 
alternative to the prevailing idea of lack of proper female 
place (Irigaray). Neither for Merleau-Ponty nor for Iriga-
ray can place and body be treated as separate entities.
16. Casey refers here to Deleuze-Guattari’s notion of “stri-
ated space as the relative global: limited in its parts, 
which are assigned constant directions, are oriented in 
relation to one another, divisible by boundaries, and can 
interlink.” Ibid., p. 183.
17. Ibid., p. 178.
18. Ibid. I am indebted to David Kolb, and a seminar of his 
in Lund in november 1999, for making clear some of the 
questionable conceptual principles of Casey’s.
19. For some reason, he does not mention Henri Lefebvre 
or Michel de Certeau in The Fate… For both of them 
space production as emanating from placial conditions 
were important, if not essential. It seems to me that Cas-
ey must be partly influenced, at least indirectly, by Henri 
Lefebvre’s The Production of Space, which is a plea for 
an interconnection of lived and conceived space/place, 
but Lefebvre is never referred to in The Fate… (except for 
a brief mentioning as one in a listing of exemplary con-
temporary place-thinkers).
20. The idea of a transarchitecture was manifested in for 
instance the philosophical/architectural collaboration 
between Jacques Derrida and Bernard Tchumi/Peter 
Eisenman. One of the actual outcomes of this, Parc de la 
Vilette in Paris, is considered by Casey as an architectonic 
failure, “without concrete issue” (Ibid., p. 312), if viewed 
in its concretion, but very important in the launching of a 
non-static conceptual tool for architects and planners.
21. Ibid., p. 201.
22. See for instance the cultural semiotics by Jurij Lotman, 
and others of the so called Tartu School, and its follo-
wers and critics, as in Göran Sonesson, ”Ego Meets Alter: 
The meaning of otherness in cultural semiotics.”
23. See Irit Rogoff, Terra Infirma: geography’s visual culture, 
p. 18.
24. In the Biennale exhibition of art in Venice, 1976, there 
was an argument between the artist Michael Asher and 
the curator of that exhibition, Germano Celant, about the 
possibility to open up a passageway in one of the walls 
of Asher’s allotted room. The passageway was there ori-
ginally but had been closed in consideration of the total 
exhibition space. Asher did not get his passageway (he 
was first promised allowance to open it), and was prepa-
red to leave Venice without participating in the exhibi-
tion, but after a written petition from seven other artists 
in the exhibition, Asher’s proposed opening in the wall 
was executed. See Michael Asher, Writings 1973–1983 
on Works 1969–1979, pp 140, 144, 145.
25. This said in accordance with how Lefebvre in The Produc-
tion of Space, “constructs” space by the interweaving of 
opposites, like the one of abstract space and absolute 
space, or that of domination and appropriation.
26. This place of fulfilment would of course, since it is an ide-
alism, in an evaluation of an actual dwelling process be 
impossible to detect as appearing in a precise moment. 
It could also be recalled here, in this context of idealisms, 
that in certain romantic aesthetics there is, apart from 
the habitational (place) and the pre-habitational (site), a 
third category, namely the post-habitational state of the 
ruin. This will not be dealt with further here though, since 
it essentially neglects human existence. An aesthetics of 
place must, if it aspires to involve lived life, include social 
interaction or individual modalities as a necessary part.
27. A modality is essentially the way in which something gi-
ven is adjusted. In the philosophical tradition of modal 
logic, it is the adjustment of a proposition according to 
such qualities as necessity, possibility or probability. As 
used in semiotics, by such authors as A J Greimas (in On 
Meaning) and Michael O’Toole (in The language of Dis-
played Art), modalisation means the way an act is influ-
enced by a subject, or the way an image is personalised 
by an artist.
28. Temporal – of time, is one of the traditional types of 
modalities in philosophy of modal logic. Another one that 
is involved in the logic of exploitation, is the deontic, a 
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modality which has to do with giving permission or ac-
hieving admittance (to a place). For a discussion of mo-
dalities as fundamental to the production of meaning, 
see for instance Algirdas Julien Greimas, On Meaning, in 
particular chapters 7 and 8, or Alan White, Modal Thin-
king.
29. Since Casey does acknowledge a temporal influence 
in the becoming of place when discussing the pheno-
menology of dwelling in general, and ideologies like 
the “architecture as event” in particular, it is surprising 
that he maintains the static axiological division bet-
ween place and site. He does not seem to accept their 
concurrent formational ability in the process of habita-
tion. As far as Casey’s analysis of dwelling is concerned, it 
is above all tied to a reading of the philosophical stages 
of Heidegger’s, who according to Casey (The Fate ofÉ, 
p. 284), finally “made for ‘place’ what Bergson made for 
‘duration’.” Also the time-related strategy of design cal-
led “Architecture as event” is discussed, in relation to 
Bernard Tchumi and Jaques Derrida, and their mutual 
interests as architect and philosopher in the architectu-
ral project Park de La Villette, Paris, but without letting it 
violate the site/place borderline.
30. A case of literal outsideness would be for instance a refu-
sal of residence permits.
31. A study of a place in terms of its repellancy (capacity of 
repelling) would probably more concretely bring social 
fabrication of space into discussion.
32. When Place and Placelessness was published in 1976, 
the feministic literature on the explicit problematic of 
place and space was not very manifold, even though the 
phenomenon of gender-based non-places was only too 
obvious. One may think of for instance Doreen Massey’s 
memory of herself, as a nine year old girl travelling by 
bus alongside the large playing fields by the River Mer-
sey – puzzled over the sight that “whole vast areas where 
covered with little people and all of them were boys.” See 
Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender, p. 185. Further, 
Relph’s model is, when judged in the light of migration 
and immigration, only a hinting at the mechanisms of 
exclusion/inclusion, but could, it seems, if taken farther, 
inform analyses in this field.
33. Edward Relph, Place and Placelessness, p. 51.
34. Ibid.
35. We may here compare with Marc Augé’s interest in the 
visitor/traveller, i.e. the seminal figure needing the cons-
truction of a new type of study, namely the sociology of 
solitude.
36. Ibid., p. 61. It seems that Relph, when discussing the se-
ven categories, often have in mind a visiting scientist 
(geographer, anthropologist). This is partly explained by 
the fact that he borrows three fundamental categories 
– behavioural (“dispassionate”), empathetic, and cogni-
tive (“going native”) – from a rendering (Peter Berger’s) of 
the levels of an anthropologist’s assimilation to a place 
(Ibid., p. 50). Relph makes a terminological replacement 
of Berger’s “cognitive” with “existential,” thus perhaps im-
plying a focus more on the relation to a place than on the 
comprehension of that relation.
37. The fact that this long-lasting conception – of ar-
tists and scientists as “standing outside” and modelling 
for the personality trait of “not belonging” – has been a 
subject for deconstruction within both art and science 
during 20th century, does not seem to concern Relph 
in his exemplification. His out-set in the model of the 
anthropologist’s degrees of closeness to the obser-
ved society would, it seems to me, in itself be radical 
enough to make him hesitate to use scientists and artists 
as the clichés for outsideness.
38. Today, some twenty-five years after the publication of 
Place and…, the role of computer-based mediation 
would of course have to be added here, in its capacity 
of providing vicarious insideness, (virtual realities and 
net-based living) and letting this be experienced in ever 
vaster societal and geographical strata.
39. Ibid., p. 60.
40. Ibid., p. 53. It becomes obvious through other parts of 
Place and… (p. 45–46), that Relph hereby criticises a re-
ductive tendency in other place theory, such as Kevin 
Lynch’s, which to a larger extent is based on this simplified 
(perceptional) type of spatial recognition and identifica-
tion. For an elaboration on the differences between Relph 
and Lynch, see Ingrid Järnefeldt, Identity-identification: 
aspects of identity in the built environment. Järnefeldt 
also makes an attempt of applying Relph’s categories in 
an empirical investigation of a built environment.
41. In Place and…, p. 63–147.
42. This is done much in anger over how modern, mostly 
American, architecture destroys and prohibits good 
sense of place. A complete list of types of “placeless” geo-
graphy is provided by Relph, ibid, p. 118–121.
43. Ibid., p. 80.
44. Ibid., p. 132.
45. Ibid., p. 93, referring to J. B. Jackson.
46. Ibid., p. 95.
47. Frampton’s sources in Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six 
Points for an Architecture of Resistance, the short and 
polemic plea for a modern place-oriented architecture, 
are many, among them Paul Ricoeur and his distinction 
between Culture and Civilisation. He is also referring to 
Heidegger’s distinction between Spatium and Raum 
(TowardsÉ, pp 24–25), in his defence for a bounded pla-
ce-form against the reign of an international and high-
tech-dominated non-place architeture.
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48. Since phenomenology as a Husserlian discipline set out 
to avoid scientific presuppositions, this label might seem 
paradoxical. I am here however basically referring to 
idealised interpretations of earlier phenomenological 
philosophy. To what degree it is possible to avoid a 
priori elements, and prejudiced notions, in any process 
of eidetic reduction, or in any phenomenological investi-
gation, is a question out of scope of this essay to discuss.
49. Also architects, like for instance Steven Holl, refer to 
phenomenology as a tool to reach a presumably good 
place.
50. The passage in The Fate…, where Casey performs his 
most close-reading investigation of place-oriented phi-
losophy, is when he approaches Heidegger. He suggests 
that H. in his investigations of “the ontological problem 
of space” experienced “angst of a distinctly philosophical 
sort,” when faced with the possibility of finding “not only 
nothing but nowhere” as the basis for “Dasein’s ineluc-
table being not-at-home (un-heim-lich).” The Fate…, p. 
254. According to Casey, H. then made a halt in his expli-
cit interest of the problem of place and space, only to re-
turn in his later writings to “place” as a more dynamic and 
action-based concept. But despite this investigation into 
what we might call the interdependence of place and 
non-place, Casey treats “site” as a recurrent and simplified 
opposition to “place.”
51. A notion such as “authenticity,” for instance, was used 
in Place and… one-sidedly as substituting for positive 
values like trueness, sincerity and genuineness, whereas 
inauthenticity consequently became a major characteris-
tic of placelessness: “inauthentic existence is stereotyped, 
artificial, dishonest, and planned by others.” (Place and 
Placelessness, p. 80.) Instead of being accepted as two 
necessary ingredients they are used as a tool for the se-
paration of “place” and “non-place,” or simply for classifi-
cation of places as good or bad. Strangely enough, Relph 
first admits that Heidegger – obviously a central, even 
if mostly indirectly referenced source of inspiration 
– takes pains to stress that inauthenticity (in Heideggers 
philosophy essentially closeness to the world) “is of no 
lower existential order than authenticity – only a different 
one.” But in the next paragraph he relapses into a solely 
negative connotation.
52. I mean modernity here as a condition, as an ideology of re-
newal, rather than as a time period or style. So viewed, 
concepts like “postmodernity” and “supermodernity” 
may very well be included in an analysis of modernity, 
and not simply as contradictory to it, or as stages totally 
separated from it.
53. The most reactionary side of this type of philosophy – a 
slant of which Heidegger as a predecessor can not be free 
of guilt, even if he also tried to, as Casey has it, struggle 
“against himself” – would be a sentiment towards a 
self-contained world, or even towards a lost one.
54. Artistic and architectural practices may be viewed as 
spatial, situational and placial activities performed with 
more or less criticism against the prevailing aesthetic 
idioms or the regional or local restrictions. The critical 
handling of these objectives is the essential stance in 
Kenneth Frampton’s notion of “critical regionalism.” In 
Towards a Critical Regionalism, Frampton views topo-
logical, climatological and tectonic qualities as the most 
prominent ones, rather than keeping an openness towards 
the cultural, and the actually lived, specifics of “the re-
gional.” Partially, Frampton’s bias can be explained in the 
light of the fact that he, just as Casey and Relph, in diffe-
rent ways lean on aesthetic preferenses and ready-made 
interpretations of phenomenological analysis of place. 
For a critique of Frampton’s limited notion of “regional,” 
see Miwon Kwon, Site Specificity and the Problematics of 
Public Art: Recent Transformations at the Intersection of 
art and Architecture.
55. The expression “social grammar” is an influence from a 
paper presented by David Kolb in Lund 2000. On Kolb’s 
notion of grammar as related to place, see for instance his 
internet-based Project  on Contemporay Places at http://
abacus.bates.edu/~dkolb/dkht/index/generalo/place-
gra/grammari.html
56. SI can be said to be early if seen from a perspective of 
the concerns of contemporary art. Constituted in the 
1950s much as an anti-art movement, consisting mainly 
of artists, writers, film-makers and architects, their pro-
duction has later been described as both art, architecture 
and anarchistic politics. By means of written pamphlets, 
cartographic re-ordering and environmental actions, SI 
planted ideas and techniques with which existing urban 
structures could be approached alternatively or chan-
ged according to the mood of an individual or the politi-
cal will of a group of people.
 Art as a participating response to a social circumstance, 
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or as an alternative social undertaking, is not, of course, 
an entirely new phenomenon. We may only extend our 
perspective and think of constructivism, of Goya, of church 
paintings, of street happenings, etc. In later years though, 
direct confrontation with parts of society outside of the 
traditional exhibition spaces has emerged in art forms 
labelled social art, environmental art and relational aest-
hetics. Today, if we want to give justice to contemporary 
artistic work, an aesthetics is needed which to a larger 
extent includes social and epistemological issues, as well 
as medial and formal ones.
57. Typical activist strategies (or techniques) were “drifting 
(dérive),” “détournement,” “decomposition,” “psychoge-
ography,” and “constructed situations.” Drifting (dérive) 
was launched as a technique for passing through varied 
environments, using guidelines alien to the normal pat-
terns of movements; Détournement is a strategy of re-
organisation and re-contextualisation, directed towards 
prefabricated aesthetic elements. In this sense there is 
no essential situationist painting, architecture, or mu-
sic, only a situationist use of these and other already 
existing media; Decomposition aims at “helping” tradi-
tional cultural forms to destroy themselves, through the 
application of “superior” means of cultural construction; 
Psychogeography was to be the study of the precise ef-
fects of a geographical setting, consciously managed or 
not, directed by the mood and behaviour of an indivi-
dual; Constructed situations were “moments of life,” con-
structed as concrete and deliberate activites of spatial 
and temporal sort, involving art, technology and human 
needs.
 Only parts of the many-folded situationist activities did 
reach direct publicity in mass media, but the movement 
is often considered to be one of the influential forces be-
hind not only later activity-based art but also a catalyst 
in the student revolts and strikes that culminated in Paris 
1968. And in the 1990s their activity-based conception of 
art and architecture has had renewed interest for muse-
ums and artists, and to a certain extent also for schools 
of architecture. See for instance 1) Theory of the dérive 
and other situationist writings on the city, 2) Situationis-
tische Internationale 3) Basic Banalities: Brief History of 
the Situationist International.
58. For an interesting analysis of the origins of situationism, 
as a response to an historical condition, see Jonathan Cra-
ry, “Spectacle, Attention, Counter-Memory,” in October: 
the second decade, 1986–1996.
59. Formulaire pour un urbanisme noveau was written by 
Ivan Chtcheglov, under the pseudonyme of Gilles Ivain. 
Written 1953 it was not published until 1958 in the first SI 
manifest. (Published in english in Ken Knabb, ed., Situa-
tionist International Anthology (Berkeley Bureu of Public 
Secrets, 1981, and in a number of other publications 
thereafter.) Chtcheglov was a member of the Lettriste In-
ternational (dominated by Guy Debord), one of the two 
main movements that formed SI (the other one being 
the Cobra group, especially its derivative the Internatio-
nal Movement for an Imaginist Bauhaus).
60. For a reflection on Constant’s and Debord’s project of 
“unitary” urbanism and architecture, see various parts of 
Simon Sadler, The Situationist City.
61. Simon Sadler mentions linkage to Constant in the so cal-
led utopian architecture of such origins and schools as 
Team 10; the “Place”-exhibition at ICA in London; Archi-
gram; AA of London; Richard Rogers; Bernard Tschumi; 
Nigel Coates and the NATO-group. See The Situationist 
City, p 163.
62. Which has an obvious aftermath in what has since then 
been noted as “symbolic space” or “semiotic space,” no-
tions that can be traced back to Lefebvre, but are used 
later in the fashion of Baudrillard, Augé, and others.
63. Guy Debord, “Theorie de la dérive,” in Sitationist Interna-
tional Anthology, ed. Knabb, Ken, p. 50-54.
64. Simon Sadler, The Situationist City, p. 78.
65. To my view the walkie-talkie, apart from it being a pre-
runner to the mobile phone, also has the particular 
quality of having a loudspeaker that makes it possible 
to address a physically grouped number of listeners simul-
taneously. This creates a sense-of-group other than if the 
same group of people would have access to one mobile 
phone each.
66. It serves to be noted here that Michel de Certeau, in 
The Practice of Everyday Life, makes an attempt to ela-
borate the modalities of tactic walking, i.e. taking paths 
unexpected if seen from a prescribed, or normal, point 
of view. Certeau emphasises the effects that individu-
ally conducted walking, and reading (signs), have in the 
production of space. The resemblance here with the si-
tuationist drifting is of no coincidence. Henri Lefebvre’s 
dynamical notion of space production is an obvious link 
and source here.
67. See for instance Augé, Marc, Non-places: introduction 
to an anthroplogy of supermodernity. Augé links a “su-
permodern” condition, ruled by mediated impressions, 
that has created a new type of solitude, to our living in a 
“symbolic universe.” The notion of a “symbolic” or “semio-
tic” society often returns as denoting the increase of arti-
ficial or mediated sensations today, at times in reference 
to Jean Baudrillard’s analyses of the impact of simulacra 
in contemporary conditions and artefacts. Despite the 
perhaps dubious over-belief in the correlation between 
“mediated” and “semiotic,” this shows that the issue of se-
cond hand impressions is a highly contemporary one.
68. Kenneth Frampton’s position could be said to be so-
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mewhere in between Relph and SI, since he pleas through 
the notion of “critical regionalism” for an architecture 
that uses current technology on local conditions. In his 
neglect of actual cultural difference though, he essenti-
ally up-dates Relph’s good-taste-stance with a new set of 
aesthetic preferences. See Miwon Kwon, Site Specificity 
and the Problematics of Public Art: Recent Transforma-
tions at the Intersection of art and Architecture, pp 95-
96.
69. Placial = of place and place formation. In analogy with 
space/spatial and site/situational. Se footnote 1.
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